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REAL PRoPERTY-Ll:CENSEs-REvocAB1LITY OF PARoL LICENSES WHICH
HAVE BEEN AcTED UPON-Plaintiff, operator of a boat company, owned land
adjoining a river. X held land between that of the plaintiff and a county road.
Plaintiff, seeking to secure a way from his property to the county road, offered
by letter to purchase forty acres from X, and upon refusal, attempted to buy
a forty foot strip, which was agairr refused. There was further correspondence,
in which the parties referred to an "easement" or a "right of way," which
terminated in a letter from X saying: ''From the standpoint of this company,
there will be no objection to you building a road ... ," and directing plaintiff to
proceed with construction, and saying that any further arrangements would be
made at a later time. Plaintiff spent $1,000 in developing the road and used it
for two years. X sold the property to defendant Cooley, who was fully aware
of the arrangements with the plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, defendant Slater,
plaintiff's competitor, dynamited the road without defendant Cooley's perrmss10n. Plaintiff's action was to enjoin further interference with his use of
the road. On appeal by Cooley from a lower court judgment for plaintiff, held,
affirmed. The court said that it would be a fraud upon the plaintiff to allow
the license to be revoked, and called the interest a "permanent license.''1 Hunter
v. Slater, 331 Mich. 1, 49 N. W. (2d) 33 (1951).
Courts considering this problem2 face two basic canons of law: (a) the
statute of frauds, which requires transfers of interest in land to be by written
conveyance,3 and (b) the equitable principle of preventing fraud. It is clear

l Courts often call the protected interest an irrevocable license. See Clark v. Glidden,
60 Vt. 702, 15 A. 358 (1888). The interest is in effect an easement, regardless of what
label the court gives to it. Stoner v. Zucker, 148 Cal. 516, 83 P. 808 (1906).
2 For discussion of the general topic see: Conard, "Unwritten Agreements for Use of
Land," 14 RoCKY MT. L. Rav. 153, 294 (1942); CLARK, REAL CoVENANTs AND OnmR
!Nr.EREsTs WmCH RUN W:tra THE LAND, 2d ed., 15-64 (1947).
3 The plaintiff did not urge that the letter from X satisfied the statute of frauds so as
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from the decided cases that there is no uniform rule as to when a court will set
aside the statute of frauds in order to declare the license irrevocable. It is likewise clear that most courts will, in what they consider a proper case, grant
equitable relief to the licensee, regardless of what they consider the general rule
to be. 4 The answer to the problem would seem to lie in a realization that each
decision must rest on its own peculiar operative facts, rather than upon some
broad general rule or exception. 5 Once the court concedes that the statute of
frauds should not be used to perpetrate fraud, it must decide from the facts
presented whether revocation of the license would be a fraud upon the licensee.
In doing this it is immaterial whether the court utilizes the equitable theory of
estoppel,6 or of specific performance of parol contracts partly performed,7 or
merely says that upon the facts it would or would not be conscionable to allow
revocation. What facts, then, are necessary to justify a refusal to invoke the
statute of _frauds? Although there is some conflict, it is clear that a promise,
express or implied, 8 by the licensor authorizing the user, reliance by the licensee
in the form of expenditure of money or labor, and an actual user are required. 9
In the principal case the court found a promise by the licensor of something in
the nature of an easement or permanent right of way, an expenditure of $1,000
by the licensee in developing the road, and an actual use thereof for two
years. If the negotiations between the parties had concerned a temporary
user, or one for a definite period which had elapsed, the result should have been
the opposite, as there would be no fraud upon the licensee by revocation under
these circumstances.10 The court in the principal case recognized this when it
distinguished an earlier Michigan case11 in which only a temporary use was
contemplated by the parties. It would seem that the relative value of the
road to the licensee as compared with the corresponding detriment to the licensor
to create an easement, nor did the court discuss this possibility. From the portion of the
correspondence included in the opinion, this position would seem warranted. The letter
merely gives the plaintiff permission to start construction of the road and states that other
arrangements will be made later. There are no appropriate words of grant which would
constitute the letter a "deed or conveyance in writing" as is required by the Michigan
statute of frauds to create an easement or other interest in land. Mich. Comp. Laws (1948)
§566.106, Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.906.
4 See annotations in 49 L.R.A. 497 (1900); 19 L.R.A. (n.s.) 700 (1909); 25 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 727 (1910). For more recent citations see notes in 53 C.J.S. 816 to 818 (1948).
5 Page v. Lydic, 123 Kan. 122, 254 P. 316 (1927).
6 Baum v. Denn, 187 Ore. 401, 211 P. (2d) 478 (1949).
7 Rerick v. Kern, (Pa. 1826) 14 S. & R. 267. This doctrine is an application of the
equitable principle that an oral contract for the sale of land is enforceable in equity by a
grantee who has made improvement in reliance on the grant. Seavy v. Drake, 62 N.H.
393 (1882).
s Promise may not be implied from mere acquiescence of the owner: Leininger v.
Goodman, 277 Pa. 75, 120 A. 772 (1923).
9 Some courts hold that there must be consideration or benefit to the licensor: Shaw
v. Profitt, 57 Ore. 192, 109 P. 584 (1910).
10 Davis v. Tway, 16 Ariz. 566, 147 P. 750 (1915).
11 Nowlin Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 119 Mich. 40G, 78 N.W. 338 (1899).
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would be an influential factor in an equitable proceeding, but neither this
court nor other decided cases in point outwardly appear to give consideration
to this fact. In the instant case the licensee seemed to have a real need for
the road, while there was no showing of substantial detriment to the servient
landowner. These facts would appear to be a sufficient basis upon which to
grant equitable relief in a controversy between the licensor and licensee, but
in the principal case defendant Cooley was the grantee of the licensor. The
court logically held that Cooley was bound just as the licensor because he
took with notice12 of the plaintiff's claim. This is in accord with equitable
principles and the decided cases.13
Charles E. Oldfather

1 2 As to what constitutes notice: Campbell v. Indianapolis & Vincennes R.R. Co., I IO
Ind. 490, 11 N.E. 482 (1886).
13 Leininger v. Goodman, supra note 8; Shaw v. Profitt, supra note 9.

